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ABSTRACT
To enhance public service performance (PSP), public organizations are challenged to
optimize and innovate their processes, techniques, policies and services. But can
public organizations go too far when innovating and optimizing? Based on survey
data from Dutch water authorities, we show that optimization initially contributes
more to PSP than innovation, but its contribution is curvilinear: the impact of
optimization becomes smaller the more optimization is conducted. The relation
between innovation and PSP is, however, linear. Based on additional qualitative
data, we show that ambidextrous water authorities run less risk of over-optimizing
and use integrative strategies to deal with innovation-optimization tensions.
KEYWORDS Innovation; optimization; public service performance; non-linearity; mixed-method
Introduction
The public sector is urged to innovate to enhance public service performance (PSP)
and at the same time to continuously optimize current operations in order to
enhance efficiency (e.g. Osborne and Brown 2011; Hartley, Sørensen, and Torfing
2013). In the last decades, the effort from public service organizations (PSOs) to
improve quality, efficiency and effectiveness of public services has been influenced
strongly by New Public Management (NPM) principles of economic rationalization
and business-like thinking. PSOs have imported many business-like concepts, prac-
tices and instruments such as performance and strategic management, quality man-
agement, more managerial autonomy, a more entrepreneurial and innovative culture,
and enhanced ‘customer’ orientation (George and Desmidt 2014; Pollitt and Dan
2013; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017). There is indeed evidence that management
reforms and performance management practices – on average – contribute to PSP
(e.g. Walker, Damanpour, and Devece 2010a; Gerrish 2016), although critiques on
these reforms and practices remain potent. However, an incessant focus on efficiency
and performance measurement can also result in efforts to optimize processes to
achieve short-term performance targets efficiently, but introduce barriers to innova-
tion, with an inherent risk for the organization’s long-term results (e.g. Hartley,
Sørensen, and Torfing 2013; De Bruijn 2002). Scholars argue that PSOs thus face
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a trade-off between achieving short-term performance goals such as efficiency and
effectiveness, and long-term or strategic goals centred more on societal outcomes
(Verbeeten 2008).
In this article, we enhance our understanding of the improvement of PSP by
studying the contribution of discontinuous innovation and of continuous incremen-
tal improvement to PSP, and also address the tension between the two. We introduce
the term ‘optimization’ for continuous incremental improvement (Gieske, Van
Meerkerk, and Van Buuren 2018) to avoid confusion related to the term ‘improve-
ment’ and its conflation with innovation (Osborne and Brown 2011). Moreover, it is
also important to emphasize that optimization in our paper should not be conflated
with a sole focus on efficiency, i.e. the constant reproduction of the existing against
lower costs or in a shorter time (Behn and Kant 1999), – rather, optimization implies
a continuous focus on improving existing services, polices, process and techniques.
The ability to pursue innovation and, at the same time, optimize existing pro-
cesses, products or services is referred to as ambidextrous capacity (Duncan 1976;
Tushman and O’Reilly 1996; Smith and Umans 2015). Organizational ambidexterity
is important because even though innovation and optimization compete for resources
in the short term, they are both necessary (and mutually reinforcing) to enable long-
term success (He and Wong 2004; Smith and Lewis 2011). Organizational ambidex-
terity of private organizations has been studied extensively (e.g. March 1991; Gibson
and Birkinshaw 2004; Junni et al. 2013). Studies in the public sector have more
recently begun to emerge (e.g. Choi and Chandler 2015; Smith and Umans 2015;
Cannaerts, Segers, and Henderickx 2016; Gieske, Van Buuren, and Bekkers 2016;
Boukamel and Emery 2017).
However, ambidexterity is difficult to achieve. Organizations that are good in
either innovating or optimizing run the risk of over-innovating or over-optimizing,
which can undermine their performance. If they engage too hastily in innovation at
the expense of optimization they may suffer the costs of experimentation and take too
many risks without gaining many benefits (March 1991). This can trap an organiza-
tion in an endless cycle of failure and unrewarding change, the so-called failure trap
(Levinthal and March 1993; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006; Choi and Chandler
2015) or innovation trap. Over-optimizing organizations stick too long to an opti-
mization strategy where innovation is needed, because of its short-term success and
limited risk (March 1991; Levinthal and March 1993; Choi and Chandler 2015; Sirén,
Kohtamäki, and Kuckertz 2012; Uotila et al. 2009). The risk of this so-called success
trap (Levinthal and March 1993; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006) or optimization
trap is that organizations may be content to stay on an inferior path and ignore
a more promising path (Choi and Chandler 2015). Thus, although optimization
activities may initially enhance performance, continuously and consistently optimiz-
ing might, in the longer run, diminish it (Uotila et al. 2009).
Innovation and optimization traps are indications of the so-called ‘too much of
a good thing effect’ (TMGT) (Pierce and Aguinis 2013). As Pierce and Aguinis (2013)
point out, the TMGT effect occurs when management practices are taken too far and
their initial contribution to performance diminishes the more these practices are used
and, eventually, a negative performance impact can even emerge. Relations of this
kind typically are curvilinear and follow an inverted U-shape. Škerlavaj et al. (2017),
for example, find a curvilinear relation between idea generation and implementation;
too many novel and creative ideas lead to fewer ideas actually being implemented.
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Quantitative research on the relation between innovation, optimization and PSP is
still relatively scarce (De Vries, Bekkers, and Tummers 2015; Gieske, Van Meerkerk,
and Van Buuren 2018). This holds in particular for possible non-linear relationships
(Walker, Berry, and Avellaneda 2015). This is an important gap as strong pressures
on PSOs to enhance efficiency and accountability, and an extensive use of perfor-
mance measurement systems with their inherent pitfalls of focussing on short-term
goals and quantifiable results (Verbeeten 2008), may have resulted in a bias towards
optimization (De Bruijn 2002; Hartley, Sørensen, and Torfing 2013). It thus seems
quite likely that PSOs risk over-optimizing, whereby more optimization no longer
contributes significantly to PSP, and innovation might be a more beneficial strategy.
Although over-innovation in PSOs may seem less likely, innovation has long been
hailed as the panacea to many maladies of PSOs (Osborne and Brown 2011), and
many organizational and management innovations have been introduced under NPM
and post-NPM reforms (Hartley 2005; Hartley, Sørensen, and Torfing 2013). Some of
the mixed outcomes of these innovations may be attributed to a too hastily and
frequent introduction (Choi and Chandler 2015). For instance, Wynen, Verhoest,
and Kleizen (2017) find that PSOs with a more turbulent history of reforms are less
likely to develop an innovation-oriented culture. Furthermore, evidence of an
inverted U-shape relationship between innovation activities and (financial) perfor-
mance has been reported in private sector literature (e.g. Uotila et al. 2009).
This article contributes to public management research by examining the poten-
tially non-linear relationships between optimization, innovation and PSP, and the
tensions between the two, using a mixed-method design. We study these relation-
ships in Dutch regional water authorities (RWAs), which are functional democracies
responsible for regional water management, flood protection and sewage treatment in
The Netherlands. The Dutch governance context of a decentralized structure with
strong local and regional governments, corporatist tradition and civic society is
potentially favourable for public innovation (Bekkers, Tummers, and Voorberg
2013). At the same time, NPM-like measures have been implemented extensively in
Dutch PSOs over the last three decades, including planning and control, service
management, competence management, quality management and performance man-
agement (Ter Bogt 2008; Verbeeten 2008; Speklé and Verbeeten 2014). The RWAs in
our sample are professional organizations with clear goals and well-defined tasks and
are fully financed by the taxes they levy themselves. Their performance is bench-
marked yearly. The transparent relation between tasks and taxes allows for well-
specified performance measurement but may also lure them into the pitfall of
focussing too much on optimization. The RWAs have undergone few structural
reforms, besides a long history of merging; their number reduced from 125 in 1990
to 21 in 2018. In recent years, they increasingly embrace New Public Governance
approaches (Osborne 2006), connecting their goals with those of other governments
and stakeholders, with whom they build long-term and trustful relations (e.g.
Edelenbos and van Meerkerk 2015). They have been strongly urged to innovate
more (Unie van Waterschappen. 2011). They thus provide a good empirical setting
to study how PSOs deal with the pressure to both optimize and innovate. In line with
the TMGT effect stipulated by Pierce and Aguinis (2013), we expect that, initially,
innovation and optimization contribute to PSP. However, this contribution may start
to diminish when too much innovation and optimization takes place. By using
a mixed method design we (a) quantitatively test these relationships and (b)
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qualitatively go deeper into the mechanisms behind potential over-optimization or
over-innovation. We will test statistically – based on survey data – whether the
relationships between optimizing, innovating and PSP are curvilinear, and thus
indicate whether optimization and innovation have diminishing returns for PSP.
We are interested in ‘total’ or ‘overall’ innovation and optimization – including
policies, services, processes and techniques -, and their impact on overall PSP, rather
than in the impact of specific types of innovation or optimization carried out at one
point in time (Yang and Pandey 2007; Walker, Damanpour, and Devece 2010a;
Walker, Berry, and Avellaneda 2015; Damanpour, Walker, and Avellaneda 2009).
In the qualitative part of the analysis we conducted focus groups to examine practices
that may cause a bias towards optimization or innovation and thus pose a risk of
getting trapped in too much optimization or innovation.
This article is structured as follows: We will first review public and private sector
literature describing adverse effects of too much innovating and optimizing activities
on performance and formulate hypotheses on curvilinearity. Next, we will describe
our mixed-methods approach and results. Finally, we will discuss the potential
drivers that underlay these results, and describe the implications for public manage-
ment theory, research and practice.
Theoretical background
Public service performance can be conceptualized as achieving public goals in an effective
and efficient manner, preserving present and future quality of public services as well as
legitimacy among stakeholders (Verbeeten 2008). It thus is a multidimensional construct
(Andrews et al. 2010; Walker, Boyne, and Brewer 2010b), often measured in terms of
efficiency, effectiveness, quality, future proofing, responsiveness and legitimacy towards
stakeholders (Boyne 2002, 2003; Yang and Pandey 2007).
Innovation and optimization are both essential for enhancing performance
(March 1991; Damanpour, Walker, and Avellaneda 2009; Junni et al. 2013; Uotila
et al. 2009; Osborne and Brown 2011; Gieske, Van Meerkerk, and Van Buuren 2018).
Innovation is generally defined as the implementation of a new – technical, organiza-
tional, policy, service or other – concept that changes and improves the functioning
and outcomes of the public sector (Hartley 2005; Walker 2007; Damanpour, Walker,
and Avellaneda 2009). This concept is perceived as new by an individual or other unit
of adoption (Rogers 2003). Innovation is associated with explorative activities, dis-
continuous renewal of processes, techniques and services, breaking with current
mindsets, generating new knowledge and learning new competences, flexibility and
experimentation, risk-taking and the possibility of failure (March 1991; Hartley,
Sørensen, and Torfing 2013; Choi and Chandler 2015). Optimization can be defined
as a gradual improvement of current policies, processes, techniques, and services, in
continuity with the past (Osborne and Brown 2011; Moore 2005). Optimization is
associated with exploitative activities, incremental improvement, refining current
practices, exploiting existing knowledge and competences, within current mindsets
(March 1991; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, and Volberda 2006; Hartley, Sørensen, and
Torfing 2013; Choi and Chandler 2015).
Organizations may have a preference for either innovating or optimizing, which –
following the Miles and Snow (1978) model – can also be labelled as a more
‘prospecting’ (i.e. innovation) or a more ‘defending’ (i.e. optimization) strategy, or
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not develop a coherent strategy at all and mainly take a ‘reactive’ stance (Boyne and
Walker 2004; Andrews et al. 2009). However, the Miles and Snow typology includes
another strategic approach, that of ‘analysers’ that balance prospective as well as
defensive elements, and create structures and processes that both allow innovation as
well as optimization (Miles et al. 1978). These analysers, which are equally dextrous
in continuously optimizing current processes, products and services and developing
and implementing new ones, are also generally referred to as ambidextrous organiza-
tions (Duncan 1976; Tushman and O’Reilly 1996; Bryson, Boal, and Rainey 2008;
Smith and Umans 2015).
However, ambidexterity is hard to achieve, as patterns of learning associated with
innovation and optimization tend to be self-reinforcing, often to the exclusion of one
another (Bedford, Bisbe, and Sweeney 2018). In private sector literature, approaches
to deal with the tension between innovation and optimization are well studied. Dual
approaches aim at separating the two in time or space, whereas trade-off approaches
treat this tension as a dilemma and advocate finding an optimal comprise or balance
(Smith and Lewis 2011; Lövstål and Jontoft 2017). In addition, dialectic approaches
seek to identify synergies and integration. Paradoxical ‘both-and’ approaches assume
that tensions persist and are beneficial, and aim at dealing with competing for
interrelated demands simultaneously, accepting as well as resolving the tensions
(Smith and Lewis 2011; Lövstål and Jontoft 2017), and are widely advocated (e.g.
Gibson and Birkinsaw 2004; Andriopoulos and Lewis 2009). Private sector research
has provided evidence of positive performance impacts of ambidexterity (Gibson and
Birkinshaw 2004; He and Wong 2004; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, and Volberda 2006).
However, relations between innovation, optimization and performance are complex
and contingent upon factors such as environmental dynamism (Jansen, Van Den
Bosch, and Volberda 2006). Moreover, they are mediated by organizational factors
such as strategic learning (Sirén, Kohtamäki, and Kuckertz 2012), and may be curvi-
linear (Uotila et al. 2009). Below we will formulate hypotheses on the nature of the
optimization and innovation relationships with PSP. As there is not much quantita-
tive research on these relationships in public sector research we will partly build on
insights on these relationships in private organizations.
PSOs have imported a range of performance management techniques and instru-
ments to enhance efficiency and quality of processes and services, and transparency
of outcomes, including rational planning, target setting and budgetary control, lean
management, and performance measurement (Arnaboldi, Lapsley, and Steccolini
2015; George et al. 2017). In a meta-analysis of the impact of performance manage-
ment, Gerrish (2016) finds a (small) positive impact on PSP for a wide range of policy
fields. Nevertheless, longitudinal studies are almost absent and the effectiveness of
imported business-like management systems is contested (e.g. Radnor and Osborne
2013). Several authors have warned for the potentially negative impact on innovation
(Arnaboldi, Lapsley, and Steccolini 2015; De Bruijn 2002; Hartley, Sørensen, and
Torfing 2013). As stated above, short-term benefits of optimization strategies,
emphasizing short-term results and efficiency of work processes, may lead to over-
optimization and prioritizing efficiency over effectiveness of public services, hamper-
ing long-term performance (e.g. Hartley, Sørensen, and Torfing 2013). Adverse
effects of ‘too much’ results-based management were found by Yang and Pandey
(2007), who show for American state health and human service agencies that results-
based management changes, including strategic management, customer orientation,
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quality improvement and benchmarking, initially have a positive relationship with
public responsiveness, but that this relationship has an inverted U-shape, i.e. with
diminishing returns and eventually even having a negative impact. Furthermore,
Andrews and Boyne (2011) find for English local authorities that the impact of
their corporate capacity, i.e. the administrative capacity to manage financial and
human resources, on PSP follows an inverted U-shaped pattern: the initially positive
impact becomes weaker and, eventually, turns negative around the mean for effec-
tiveness and cost-effectiveness. Andrews, Boyne, and Mostafa (2017) find that admin-
istrative intensity has an inverted U-shaped relationship with PSP in UK universities,
with a tipping point of one standard deviation above the mean. Private sector
research indicates that large companies also run the risk of overemphasizing optimi-
zation. For instance, Uotila et al. (2009) show that large companies over-engage in
optimization and that approximately 80% of the 279 firms in their sample engage in
suboptimal levels of innovation.
Taking stock of the theoretical and empirical insights on potential optimization
traps we conclude that these traps do occur in public as well as private organizations.
We thus hypothesize:
H1: The association between optimization and PSP is curvilinear – implying that
the positive impact of optimization on PSP diminishes the more optimization is
conducted.
Scholars and practitioners (e.g. Alburry 2005; Hartley, Sørensen, and Torfing 2013;
Torfing and Triantafillou 2016) as well as national governments and international
institutions like the EU and OECD (Bason 2018; Arundel, Casali, and Hollanders
2015) underscore the need, urgency and benefits of innovation to enhance PSP.
Innovation is often portrayed as inherently good (Osborne and Brown 2011), some-
thing PSOs and public servants ought to do, thereby constituting a moral ‘imperative’
to innovate (Jordan 2014). Several quantitative studies on the relation between
innovation and PSP provide evidence for innovation’s positive impact. For instance,
Damanpour, Walker, and Avellaneda (2009) find a positive relation between
a combination of innovation types (service, technological and administrative) and
PSP of local governments (see also Naranjo-Gil 2009). Walker, Damanpour, and
Devece (2010a) find a positive relation between management innovation and PSP,
with a mediating effect from performance management. However, the extensive
positive overtones, pressures by higher tiers of government, and desire to stand out
as ‘innovative’ PSO may draw necessary resources away from other government
services (Jordan 2014), lead to rhetoric reframing of improvements as ‘innovations’
(Osborne and Brown 2011), and disregard the costs of failure (Choi and Chandler
2015). Although Choi and Chandler (2015) qualitatively discuss innovations traps in
PSOs, quantitative studies that report negative results of innovations are extremely
rare, and mainly report on the negative impact of too frequently or too hastily
introduced structural reforms on innovativeness (Wynen, Verhoest, and Kleizen
2017). For quantitative evidence of a potential innovation trap, i.e. non-linear rela-
tions between innovation and performance, we thus turn to private sector literature.
Uotila et al. (2009) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between innovation and
financial performance of 279 firms in a longitudinal analysis over a 14-year time
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period, analysing the relative share of reported innovation versus optimization
activities. Similar results are found for SMEs (Kim and Huh 2015; Kreiser et al. 2013).
Quantitative research on innovation in private sector organizations thus points to
a potential negative impact of ‘too much’ innovation on performance. For the public
sector we found no quantitative study indicating such an impact. However, given the
findings that innovation does contribute to PSP, but that the high expectations
concerning the impact of innovation on the functioning and outcome of PSOs are
often accompanied by a strong and moral appeal to innovate and induce risks of
over-innovation, we hypothesize:
H2: The association between innovation and PSP is curvilinear – implying that the
positive impact of innovation on PSP diminishes the more innovation is
conducted.
Methods
We have applied a mixed-method approach to answer our research question. We
followed a two-step approach. Firstly, we conducted a survey among 667 respondents
in 22 RWAs in the Netherlands, measuring innovation, optimization and PSP, based
on the perceptions of organizational staff. We used staff perceptions as secondary
data on the water authorities do not provide information concerning optimizing and
innovating. Performance is expressed as compliance against policy norms of higher
tiers of government, which is a rather technical and unidimensional measurement of
PSP, and also shows little variation between RWAs (Unie van Waterschappen. 2018;
Tillema 2007). Measuring individual perceptions thus allows for a broader assessment
of our constructs, e.g. by including items on legitimacy, alignment with stakeholders
and future-proofing in the performance scale. We analysed the quantitative data and
investigated possible curvilinear relationships using OLS regression analysis in Stata.
In the next step, we discussed actual innovation and optimization practices in focus
groups in 10 RWAs, within total approximately 120 participants, and evaluated the
qualitative data to find information that may indicate innovation or optimization
traps, and help understand underlying causes. As such, we applied a sequential
explanatory mixed method design where we first sought to identify broader relation-
ships using quantitative data and then more strongly contextualize these relationships
using qualitative data (Creswell 2014).
Phase 1 quantitative analysis
Data collection
We collected data in February 2016 through an e-mail survey among the staff of the
22 RWAs involved in primary tasks in the fields of regional water management and
sewage treatment. The survey was distributed by the top management to organiza-
tional units responsible for activities within the primary task fields, i.e. flood risk
management, surface water quality and quantity management, and wastewater treat-
ment; activities include policy and planning, regulation and enforcement, and con-
struction and maintenance. Supportive services, such as administrative or financial
units were not included. In total 667 surveys were completed. The overall response
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rate is 33%. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they were a manager (18%),
process- or project leader (34%), process- or project employee (44%), or ‘other’ (4%).
Furthermore they were asked to indicate their task field: flood protection (15%),
water quantity management (27%), water quality management (11%), sewage treat-
ment (22%), or overarching (25%). Eighteen per cent of the respondents were female.
The average age was 47.
Measures
We built on existing scales that we adapted to the context of Dutch water authorities
and the phrasing commonly understood in this context (see Table 1). In line with
earlier research, we used comprehensive scales that aggregate different constituting
elements of our constructs to measure innovation (5 items), optimization (4 items)
and PSP (6 items) (Yang and Pandey 2007; Walker, Damanpour, and Devece 2010a;
Walker, Berry, and Avellaneda 2015; Damanpour, Walker, and Avellaneda 2009). See
Table 1 for the items as well as reliability and validity measures. All items were
measured using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from totally disagree to totally agree.
Reliability and validity
Convergent and discriminant validity of the measurement scales were examined,
based on confirmatory factor analysis. Factor loadings were larger than 0.60, above
the conservative cut-off level of 0.5 (Hair et al. 1995), which demonstrates convergent
validity (Table 1). Furthermore, the composite reliability indexes of the constructs
were above 0.80, exceeding the 0.60 threshold (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Average
Variance Extracted (AVE) was above 0.50, further demonstrating convergent validity.
Corrected item-to-total correlations were greater than the general threshold of 0.40
(Field 2005). Cronbach’s alphas were above 0.8, exceeding the widely accepted cut-off
value of 0.70. The AVE of the constructs were larger than the corresponding squared
inter-construct correlations (SIC), revealing the distinctiveness of each construct and
thus discriminant validity. Finally, we calculated the Heterotrait-Monotrait ratio
Table 1. Measurement scales for innovating, optimizing and public service performance, including factor
loadings and reliability coefficients.
Measurement scales
Innovating (adapted from: Jansen et al. 2006; Popadiuk 2012; Prieto and Pérez Santana 2012)
To improve performance for my work field my organization has during the last five years: Implemented
really new policies (0.7); implemented really new technology (0,704); offered really new services (0.667);
implemented really new processes (0,659); experimented with really new policies or techniques (0.748)
(AVE=0,606, CR=0,824, Cronbach’s alpha 0,825)
Optimizing (adapted from Jansen et al. 2006, and aligned with scale for innovating)
To improve performance for my work field my organization has during the last five years: Improved existing
policies (0.767); improved existing techniques (0.755); improved existing services (0.821); improved
existing processes (0.746) (AVE=0.597, CR=0.856, Cronbach’s alpha 0.848)
Public service performance (adapted from Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; Prieto and Pérez Santana 2012;
Klijn, Edelenbos, and Steijn et al. 2010; Bontis, Crossan, and Hulland 2002)
My organization has improved performance over the last five years for my work field on: efficiency (same
results against lower costs or faster) (0.742); quality (we deliver more quality against similar costs and
time) (0.781); effectiveness (we reach our goals better) (0.741); collaboration (we reach our goals better
combining those with the goals of others) (0.709); legitimacy (stakeholders are satisfied with the water
authority) (0.602); future proofing (we can face the future with trust, expected future developments are
included in policies and plans) (0.669) (AVE=0.504, CR=0.858, Cronbach’s alpha 0.856)
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(HTMT) of correlations, which has been argued to be a more robust method to assess
discriminant validity and requires looking at the average of the heterotrait-
heteromethod correlations (i.e. correlations of items across all variables) relative to
the average of the monotrait-heteromethod correlations (i.e. correlations of items
within the same variables) (Henseler, Ringle, and Sarstedt 2015). All HTMT ratios
were below the proposed cut-off of 0.90 (Teo, Srivastava, and Jiang 2008), with values
of .88 (innovation), 0.72 (optimization) and 0.85 (PSP) respectively.
Common source bias
There are two important reasons why common source bias is not of concern to our
analysis. First, in this study, we hypothesize and test non-linear relationships between
innovation, optimization and PSP. Finding significant non-linear relationships can-
not be the result of common source bias – as was demonstrated by Siemsen, Roth,
and Oliveira (2010). Indeed, if anything such bias would work against our hypoth-
eses, not for them. Second, we complement our survey data with qualitative data.
This allows us to cross-validate the reliability of the uncovered statistical results while
simultaneously providing further clarification and deepening of the findings (George
and Pandey 2017).
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Descriptives and correlations between variables are reported in Table 2. There is
a strong correlation between perceived levels of optimization and innovation. The
relationship is a bit stronger compared to private sector findings (e.g. Gibson and
Birkinshaw 2004; Cao, Gedajlovic, and Zhang 2009). The mean for optimization is
higher than that for innovation, indicating that respondents agree more with the
statements that their RWA has engaged in optimizing activities in the last five years.
Statistical analysis
In order to test H1 and H2, we employ OLS regression analysis using Stata. First, we
construct a linear model where PSP is the dependent variable and innovating,
optimizing as well as the controls are the independent variables. Second, we construct
a non-linear model by adding the squared terms of innovating and optimizing. Such
an approach is typically used to assess non-linear relationships (see, for instance,
Andrews and Boyne 2011). Before constructing the model we need to make sure that
we adhere to the assumptions of OLS regression modelling (Lee, Benoit-Bryan, and
Johnson 2012). Our respondents are clustered in different organizations and are thus
not independent – we account for this issue by using clustered standard errors at the
organizational level. Our dependent variable is an aggregation of separate survey
items which means that the variable is continuous; linear regression modelling is
preferred. Heteroscedasticity can be a problem when using OLS. We controlled for
Table 2. Means, standard deviations and correlations.
SD Mean 1 2
1 Public service performance 0.93 4.75
2 Innovating 1.14 4.7 .590**
3 Optimizing 1.09 4.87 .663** .658**
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
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this issue by using the robust standard errors option in Stata. Another potential issue
is multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the independent variables
are, however, all below 5 thus suggesting the absence of multicollinearity.
Phase 2: qualitative analysis
Data collection
Following this quantitative research, we did qualitative research on the innovation
and optimization practices of the RWAs using focus groups. Focus group discussion
is an efficient technique for qualitative data collection on personal as well as collective
opinions and experiences (Robson 2002; Robinson 1999; Ryan et al. 2014). They
allow for natural quality controls on data collection as participants interact and
discuss and thereby tend to provide checks and balances on each other and extreme
views tend to be weeded out. Furthermore, group dynamics help in focusing on the
most important topics and it is more easy to assess the extent to which there is
a consistent and shared view (Robson 2002; Robinson 1999).
We sent an invitation to all RWAs, 10 RWAs were willing to participate. The
participating RWAs are well distributed geographically, as well as over the score
range (means per RWA for innovating, optimizing and PSP range, respectively,
between 3.94 and 5.8, 4.62 and 5.8, 3.86 and 5.26) and include the RWAs with the
lowest (RWA1) and highest mean scores (RWA10) of the 22 water authorities. Per
RWA we convened two focus groups: one with managers and one with employees.
This design was chosen because the responses of the different functional groups differ
significantly (managers score higher compared to process- or project leaders, and
even more so compared to process- or project employees) and because of the
different roles of managers and employees. This design enhances safety for employees
in expressing conflicts and concerns and reduces the risk of the influence of hierarchy
and power dynamics (Robson 2002). Group sizes ranged from 4 to 8, resulting in
approximately 120 participants in total.
We followed a semi-open design that allowed participants to formulate personal
opinions and experiences as well as explore and express collective experiences (Ryan
et al. 2014) guided by the following questions: ‘In relation to innovation and
optimization: what characterizes the current practice within the RWA, what works
well in this water authority and what could be improved?’ We expected that discus-
sion on the first questions would reveal formal and informal routines that are helpful
for innovation and optimization, and the reverse for the third question. We did not
question ‘over-optimization’ or ‘over-innovation’ directly, but let discussions evolve
naturally around the practices of innovation and optimization in order to get a broad
perspective of these practices.
We coded the transcripts of the group discussions in two steps. First, we focussed
on formal and informal practices, to obtain an understanding of espoused and actual
practices of innovation and optimization (Brown and Duguid 1991). Understanding
the actual, non-canonical practices may help to reveal clues on the underlying
mechanisms or causes for a stronger focus on optimization or innovation. We thus
coded for formal strategies, policies and procedures for innovation and optimization
and for informal routines, the latter including remarks on actual practices as well as
remarks that reflect perceptions of norms, values and identity. The second step in our
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coding consisted of identifying remarks that describe something that occurs ‘very
much’ or ‘too much’, or that indicates an optimization trap or an innovation trap.
Results
Phase 1: quantitative analysis
Table 3 presents the results of both the linear and non-linear model. First, we discuss
the linear model. This model explains about 51% of variation in PSP and is statisti-
cally significant. Both innovating and optimizing have a significant positive associa-
tion with PSP, with optimizing having a seemingly stronger association (i.e. higher
coefficient). Second, we discuss the non-linear model. This model slightly outper-
forms the linear model by explaining 52% of the variation in PSP. It is also
statistically significant. Although the difference in R Square between the linear and
non-linear model is seemingly small, the change in F-value does signal that the non-
linear model fits the data better than the linear model. The model indicates that there
is a curvilinear association between optimizing and PSP (i.e. we accept H1) but not
between innovating and PSP (i.e. we reject H2). Specifically, the coefficient for
optimizing is significant and positive whereas the coefficient for its squared term is
significant and negative. This indicates an initially positive association between
optimizing and PSP that starts to diminish the more optimization is conducted. In
both the linear and non-linear model, the control variables show similar results –
which indicates model stability.
Table 3. Linear and non-linear models predicting public service performance.
Linear model Nonlinear model
Variables B s.e. B s.e.
Constant 1.915*** .202 1.346** .403
Innovating .225*** .042 −.135 .208
Innovating2 .041+ .021
Optimizing .386*** .049 .996*** .181
Optimizing2 −.067** .017
Function (manager is reference)
Project leader −.216 .142 −.236+ .134
Project employee −.154 .113 −.157 .102
Other −.215* .096 −.220* .084
Education (university is reference)
HBO (higher vocational education) .031 .065 .021 .066
MBO (secondary vocational education) −.268** .074 −.271*** .060
Other −.700** .206 −.576*** .107
Task field (flood risk management is reference)
Water quantity management .149+ .084 .183* .081
Water quality management .191+ .094 .218* .095
Sewage treatment .248* .101 .272* .100
More than one .072 .061 .094 .056
N 571 571
F-value 174.73*** 198.39***
R2 .513 .524
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Note 1: Clustered robust standard errors at the organizational level are used.
Note 2: Our final N includes only respondents for who no missing values were found for all the variables
included in the model. This reduced our dataset to 571 respondents.
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In Figure 1, we visualize the significant non-linear association between optimizing
and PSP including the accompanying 95% confidence interval. This figure clearly
shows a ‘flattening-out’ of the contribution of optimizing, indicating that optimizing
initially helps enhance PSP, but the more optimization is being conducted, the
weaker the performance impact becomes.
To quantify these diminishing returns of optimization, we have added the pre-
dicted values of PSP for different values of optimization in Table 4. When optimiza-
tion moves from 1 to 2 on a 7 point scale, performance increases with about 11%.
However, when optimization moves from 6 to 7 on a 7 point scale, performance
increases with only about 2%. Clearly, these diminishing returns are significant.
Controls
To control for potentially confounding variables, several respondent characteristics
were added as controls in the model (see Table 3). We included characteristics that
could potentially associate with perceived PSP (Choi and Rainey 2010), i.e. the
function of the respondent (manager, project/process leader, project/process mem-
ber, or other), the work field in which the respondent is active and the level of
education. We constructed dummy variables for these controls to include them in the
analysis. There are significant relationships with PSP for education, function and task
Figure 1. Curvilinear relationship between optimizing and public service performance.
Table 4. Diminishing returns on public service performance (PSP) of more optimization.
Optimization value
PSP
value Delta-method s.e.
Delta
PSP
(%) t p-value 95% confidence interval
1 2.524 .322 7.85 .000 [1.855, 3.193]
2 3.319 .195 11.4 17.04 .000 [2.914, 3.723]
3 3.979 .102 9.4 39.13 .000 [3.767, 4.190]
4 4.504 .047 7.5 96.11 .000 [4.407, 4.602]
5 4.895 .040 5.6 123.85 .000 [4.813, 4.978]
6 5.152 .056 3.7 91.66 .000 [5.035, 5.269]
7 5.274 .091 1.7 57.70 .000 [5.084, 5.464]
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field. Respondents with a lower level of education generally scored PSP a bit lower
than those with a higher level of education, as do respondents with function ‘other’,
i.e. administrative roles. A possible explanation may be that being in lower level
functions, for which a lower level of education is required, or in administrative roles,
makes it harder to overview the overall innovating and optimizing efforts as well as
performance gains in a task field. Respondents from the field of flood risk manage-
ment judge PSP significantly lower than respondents from other fields. This is not
surprising as this is the most strongly regulated task field, with legally prescribed
procedures of testing against national norms and high standards for construction and
maintenance. Thus for this task field enhancing PSP is inherently less easy and
presumably least necessary.
Phase 2: qualitative analysis
Optimization
In this section, we investigate why optimization does – as expected – have
a curvilinear relationship with PSP in the RWAs. Our qualitative results support
and refine our quantitative findings, as we will elaborate below. The RWAs apply
results-based management, draft obligatory strategic plans, and engage in different
types of formal improvement processes. They apply lean techniques, standardized
and ISO-certified work processes, implemented Plan-Do-Check-Act approaches to
evaluate policies and projects, and encourage improvement proposals from the work
floor. The following quote of a RWA7 employee illustrates this: ‘I think we have
arranged our processes for an organization that is fully geared to optimizing.’ Some
RWAs focus predominantly on optimizing current processes, e.g. this RWA1 man-
ager says: ‘Let us take care that the things we do now are within time and budget first,
before we start to think about innovation’. Some RWAs realize in hindsight that they
have been focussing on optimization too long, e.g. a RWA2 manager states: ‘Now we
take another route, but that took a long time, had there been someone with an
innovative mind five years ago […], it could have started five years earlier. Others
are conscious of the risks of over-optimization: a RWA9 manager remarks: ‘But we
must think of something new [..]. We are still fine-tuning our system, but that knob
cannot be turned any further.’
Underlying causes may be inferred from statements that indicate that RWAs focus
too much on optimization: In RWA1 and 2 there is a strong focus on cost control. In
RWA1 budgeting of resources is strict, detailed and austere. A manager of RWA1
remarks: ‘Financially we have locked ourselves in’. An employee of RWA1 thinks that
this hampers optimization: ‘You steer very much on costs, so your performance is the
same against lower costs. But, as a result there is less and less space for optimization in
your performance.’ In RWA2 the response to the obligatory strategic plan is one of
disinterest, it is: ‘just another plan, but we will keep controlling on costs as usual.’
RWA1, 2, and 3 also feel there is too much focus on short-term results. A lack of
urgency is perceived related to future challenges. Some state that they would need
a long-term vision or a strategic agenda, and mention they tend to get caught in the
‘delusion of the day’. There is a strong inward focus, e.g. managers of RWA3 mention
they do not feel encouraged to explore new knowledge or developments, that joining
external events is ‘not done’, and market parties are viewed with suspicion.
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In all RWAs (except RWA10) managers and employees mention a high pressure
to deliver results within time and budget. They value their results-based approach,
a manager of RWA8 says: ‘We all value the perspective of the performing government.
[…] Hours, performance, quality, accountability.’ This shared value creates a high
work pressure, a manager of RWA7 states that ‘work pressure is huge, prohibitive [of
innovation]’. Others mention it inhibits reflection and learning. However, managers
are self-reflective of their roles: ‘We create time pressure ourselves, we present
a planning to the board that is too optimistic, eliminating other possibilities, […] we
pose structures on ourselves that are too tight. [..] we want to show how well we are in
control’ (manager RWA6).
There is a general understanding that there are (too) many procedures, reinforcing
familiar routines and fixed patterns. An employee of RWA6 states: ‘I can’t think of
anything that we don’t have a process or procedure for’. Procedures are often installed
to avoid risks: ‘We create a lot of superfluous rules, out of fear something goes wrong’
(manager RWA10). The strong focus on risk avoidance and scrutinizing mistakes
reinforces the focus on optimization. A RWA3 employee states: ‘We don’t manage
risks, we try to eliminate every possible risk’. Finally, participants address a tendency to
adhere to fixed patterns, by themselves: ‘You often think in the same patterns’ (RWA5
manager), or by their colleagues: ‘the operational team is a bastion of traditional
morals’ (RWA3 employee).
Thus, mechanisms that induce a bias towards optimization and a risk of over-
optimization in the RWAs are (a) a strong focus on cost control and short-term
results, (b) the pressure to perform and the role of managers therein, (c) a primarily
inward focus and abounding procedures that enforce fixed patterns in thinking and
behaviour, and (d) risk avoidance and scrutiny of failure and limited learning.
Innovation
In this section, we investigate why the relation between innovation and PSP in the
RWAs – counter to our expectation – is not curvilinear.
There are some indications in our qualitative data that RWAs may occasionally
engage too much in innovation, or find it hard to implement their innovative ideas.
Some board members and upper echelon managers have explicit ambitions, e.g. to
belong to the top 5 of the most innovative water authorities. In RWA7 an employee
notes that this ambition hampers optimization: ‘Small optimizations are part of the
job. They are seen as self-evident. But bigger optimizations, that we cannot do
ourselves, that we need money for, become projects. And then often priority is given
to innovative projects.’ In RWA9 innovation is stimulated from an organisational
learning perspective, but a RWA9 employee remarks: ‘We are very good in shaking the
idea tree. You get a lot of ideas. But how to bring them further?’ And a RWA10
manager says: ‘You see that other RWAs have faster implementation times. We have so
much brain power. We are super strong in thinking, making plans, but implementation
lags behind.’
However, when referring to their innovation practices, participants more often
mention that optimization and short-term results are prioritized over innovation and
that managers are hesitant to engage in innovation or to allow employees to do so.
Innovation takes place in a cautious and rational approach. For example, piloting and
upscaling of innovative concepts has to be supported by business cases in all RWAs.
In line with the findings on optimizing practices, that show a strong focus on results,
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optimizing current work processes and risk avoidance, over-innovation does not
seem a big risk within the RWAs.
Differences in strategic orientation
However, there are differences between the RWAs. RWA1, 2 and 3 focus on short-
term results and cost efficiency is mirrored by a restrained attitude to innovation,
which is not considered part of their mandate and is not included in formal policies.
In the Miles and Snow (1978) categories for strategic orientations they could be
classified as ‘defenders’, i.e. organizations that take a conservative view on new
developments and focus on improving the efficiency of their existing operations
(Andrews et al. 2009). This is in line with the quantitative results: the mean scores
for innovating, optimizing and PSP for these RWAs are below average (i.e., respec-
tively, 3.94–4.38; 4.62–4.95; 3.86–4.79).
RWA4-8 engage in all kinds of optimizing processes, recently mostly applying lean
methods (Radnor and Walley 2008), as well as in formalized innovation policies. They
thus show, in terms of Miles and Snow (1978), defending as well as prospecting
activities. However, they encounter difficulties synchronizing innovation and optimiza-
tion, due to their results-based approach and huge work pressure that leads to
considerable tension between innovation and optimization processes and to prioritiz-
ing regular activities, which induces a bias towards optimization. Besides, separating
innovation in dedicated teams, projects and programs hampers integration in regular
work processes, policies and regulations. Their scores for innovating, optimizing and
PSP range around average (i.e., respectively, 4.57–4.99; 4.85–5.11; 4.58–5.03).
RWA9 and 10 embrace a more societal value-oriented perspective on PSP, and see
optimization as a prerequisite for innovation. In their view stimulating innovation also
contributes to avoiding fixed patterns in thinking and behaviour. These are the most
ambidextrous organizations, ‘analysers’ in the Miles and Snow-typology, they continu-
ously search for new opportunities and experiment with responses to emerging trends,
as well as improve their incumbent policies, processes and services, in order to enhance
their contribution to societal value. Their scores for innovating, optimizing and PSP are
above average (i.e., respectively, 5.04–5.8; 5.05–5.8; 5.01–5.26).
Dealing with tensions
When asked what could be improved, managers and employees mention: developing
a long-term vision (RWAs 1–3), embracing a more integrative approach to innovation
and optimization and ensuring better internal (RWAs 4–8) and external connections
(RWA 3). They also mention that they should ask themselves and each other ‘the
innovation-or-optimization question’ on a regular basis (RWAs 1–8). Furthermore, all
RWAs call for more comprehensive performance management systems that include
measures for innovation as well as for optimization. They acknowledge that they
should improve their proficiency in risk management. The RWAs also see room for
improving organizational learning, ranging from merely ‘closing the PDCA-cycle’
(RWAs 1–3) to improve learning ‘over the policy cycle and between work floor, manage-
ment and board’ (RWA 10). Finally, they mention that support of board or upper-
echelon members for innovation is needed (especially RWAs 1–3).
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Discussion
Our quantitative analysis revealed that optimization initially contributes more to PSP
than innovation. However, the relation between optimizing and PSP is curvilinear, as
we hypothesized, indicating that at high levels of optimization the impact of even
more optimization on PSP is limited. Our qualitative analysis indicates an over-
engagement in optimization. Mechanisms behind over-optimization are a focus on
predictable short-term results, cost-efficiency and limiting risk (Levinthal and
March 1993; Uotila et al. 2009; De Bruijn 2002; Arnaboldi, Lapsley, and Steccolini
2015; Yang and Panday 2007). In line with these findings, the focus group discussions
revealed a strong results-based approach and focus on risk avoidance, whereby
current performance is mainly enhanced by optimizing existing policies, processes,
technologies and services. However, our qualitative analysis also allowed us to refine
this finding, revealing differences between the RWAs. RWAs that embrace a more
defending strategy score below average on optimizing, mainly due to their strong
focus on cost-efficiency, indicating that increasing their optimization efforts is still
beneficial for them (Boyne and Chen 2006). As they mainly engage in optimizing
they nevertheless run the risk of over-optimization, when innovation would have
been more beneficial. Examples of over-optimization were mentioned by participants
of these RWAs. RWAs that embrace a combination of prospecting and defending
strategies encounter difficulties synchronizing innovation and optimization, as their
results-based approach and huge work pressure lead to prioritizing regular activities
and following existing routines, which induces a bias towards optimization, whereas
the returns on their optimizing efforts already start to diminish. As such, these RWAs
also run a risk of over-optimization. The scores of the more ambidextrous RWAs –
‘analysers’ in the Miles and Snow-typology – are already within the realm of dimin-
ished returns on PSP. However, they are aware that further optimization efforts of
existing policies, processes and services are hardly beneficial and insufficient to
answer future challenges. Because of their greater ability to combine innovation
and optimization they run less risk of over-optimization.
We hypothesized a non-linear relationship between innovation and PSP, mainly
based on theoretical arguments (Choi and Chandler 2015) and findings for private
organizations (e.g. Uotila et al. 2009; Kreiser et al. 2013). Our quantitative results
indicate that the contribution of innovation to PSP is linear, which is in line with
previous public sector findings (Walker, Damanpour, and Devece 2010a;
Damanpour, Walker, and Avellaneda 2009). However, the extent of innovating
activities in the RWAs is relatively low. Thus, it is possible that a linear relation is
found due to a range effect, which occurs if the full range of scores of the predictor
variable is not included (Pierce and Aguinis 2013). Our focus group results indicate
an occasional emphasis on explorative activities in the invention phase of the
innovation cycle, e.g. due to ambitions of the board or upper-echelon members.
However, because innovation in the RWAs is carried out within the regular decision-
making and operational processes, and within strong restraints on risk-taking, over-
innovation is unlikely. This confirms previous findings that PSOs tend to innovate
incrementally (Damanpour, Walker, and Avellaneda 2009).
Given the strong results-orientation and restraints on risk-taking, as well as the
potential improvements mentioned in the focus groups, we assume that there is room
for improving PSP by enhancing innovation efforts, especially in the less
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ambidextrous RWAs. More ambidextrous RWAs show more integrative strategies,
embracing a ‘both-and’ approach (Smith and Lewis 2011; Lövstål and Jontoft 2017) to
optimization and innovation. Our empirical data nevertheless revealed ‘ambidextrous
behaviour’ at the work floor in all RWAs, i.e. an employee or project team will choose
for optimization or innovation, depending on their judgement of the problem or an
opportunity at hand. However, the more ambidextrous the organization is, the easier
this iteration between optimization and innovation becomes.
Conclusions
This article yields important insights for public management research, theory and
practice. We showed that optimization initially is more strongly associated with PSP
than innovation, but that at high levels of optimization its contribution to PSP
diminishes. We were also able to refine this finding in our qualitative analysis,
indicating that, whereas defending or low ambidextrous PSOs benefit most from
optimization strategies to enhance PSP, these also run the largest risk of entering an
optimization trap due to their neglect or even rejection of innovation. The reverse is
true for more ambidextrous PSOs.
Innovation is initially less strongly associated with PSP, but its contribution in
RWAs is significant and linear, although a range effect cannot be excluded (Pierce
and Aguinis 2013). As such, our results contribute to putting the ‘innovation
imperative’ (Jordan 2014; Osborne and Brown 2011) – i.e. the high expectations of
the benefits of more innovation in PSOs – in a broader perspective, indicating that
both optimization and innovation contribute to PSP. More ambidextrous strategies
help resolve the tensions between innovation and optimization, and therefore ambi-
dexterity in PSOs deserves more research attention.
In addition, as prospecting RWAs score higher on PSP, our results are in line with
previous findings (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006) that prospecting strategies are
more strongly associated with PSP than defending strategies. However, RWAs that
embrace an analysing or ambidextrous strategy show the highest scores for PSP. Our
findings thus indicate that an analysing or ambidextrous strategy may be even more
beneficial. This category has previously been excluded from public management
research (Boyne and Walker 2004; Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006; Andrews
et al. 2009) and we encourage future work to re-assess its relevance for PSOs.
Furthermore, non-linear relations are seldom reported in public management
research. Our results should trigger scholars to test for non-linearity more often.
Mixed methods research can be particularly valuable when doing so because it allows
to identify potential non-linear relationships between important public management
constructs and, simultaneously, explain the underlying causes and mechanisms. This
helps to better explain why potential non-linearity might emerge.
Our study also yields relevant insights for practitioners. For PSOs our results
indicate that although optimizing is initially more strongly associated with PSP than
innovation, PSOs should prepare for the moment ‘the knob cannot be turned any
further’, i.e. the moment that optimization no longer contributes to PSP. Moreover,
the contribution of innovation to PSP remains substantial. Thus, PSOs would benefit
from formulating more ambidextrous strategies, based on a comprehensive analysis
of the need to either optimize or innovate, and design processes and procedures to
support both. Public managers should be aware of the draw-backs of the natural
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inclination to emphasize optimization and ensure that their organization engages in
innovating activities in congruence with their optimizing activities, embrace the
tensions between the two as beneficial rather than trying to ‘regulate’ them. A well-
designed performance management system, that includes measures for innovation as
well as optimization, may support a more ambidextrous approach. Moreover, it can
stimulate learning, iterating between innovation and optimization, and counteract
biases in decision-making toward optimization (Bedford, Bisbe, and Sweeney 2018).
Limitations and future research
First, we conducted our research within Dutch RWAs. As functional democracies, they
are a rather specific type of government, being tasked with water management and
sewage treatment only. We thus need to show modesty towards the generalizability of
our findings and encourage future research to tests whether our findings hold in
different contexts, e.g. multipurpose public organizations such as municipalities, or in
other political and administrative contexts (O’Toole and Meier 2014). Second, our
analysis could suffer from endogeneity: we use cross-sectional data, and we cannot
infer causal relations, although our qualitative analyses partially mitigate this. Future
research could seek to identify relationships over time and include a baseline perfor-
mance variable to assess actual improvement in PSP (O’Toole and Meier 1999). Third,
we based our analyses on the perceptions of organizational staff concerning the perfor-
mance of their RWA. It may be interesting to test the relations between innovating,
optimizing and more objective performance measures or stakeholder assessments
because subjective performance assessment by managers have been known to show
some skewness (Meier and O’Toole 2013). Finally, we use a comprehensive scale for
PSP, aggregating several dimensions of PSP, which does not allow us to identify whether
relationships differ per PSP dimension. Our results indicate differences in the correla-
tions between the different items of optimizing and innovating with those of perfor-
mance. Future research can seek to tweak out which PSP dimensions are particularly
impacted by innovation and optimization and how. To conclude, we encourage future
scholars to engage – using both quantitative and qualitative data – with the debate on
non-linearity between optimizing, innovating and PSP to help better understand the
conditions under which such non-linearity appears.
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